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Abstract
We study the co evolution of asset prices and individual wealth in a  nancial market
populated by an arbitrary number of heterogeneous, boundedly rational agents. Using
wealth dynamics as a selection device we are able to characterize the long run market
outcomes, i.e. asset returns and wealth distributions, for a general class of investment
behaviors. Our investigation illustrates that market interaction and wealth dynamics
pose certain limits on the outcome of agents’ interactions even within the “wilderness
of bounded rationality”. As an application we consider the case of heterogeneous mean 
variance optimizers and provide insights into the results of the simulation model intro 
duced by Levy, Levy and Solomon (1994).
JEL codes: G12, D84, C62.
Keywords: Heterogeneous agents, Asset pricing model, Bounded rationality, CRRA
framework, Levy Levy Solomon model, Evolutionary Finance.
 Corresponding author. Tel.: +31 20 5254248; fax: +31 20 5254349; e mail: m.anufriev@uva.nl.
†Tel.: +39 050 883341; fax: +39 050 883344; e mail: p.dindo@sssup.it.
11 Introduction
Consider a  nancial market where a group of heterogeneous investors, each following a dif 
ferent strategy to gain superior returns, is active. The open question is to specify who will
survive in the long run and how their interaction a ects market returns. This paper seeks
to give a contribution on this issue. At this purpose, we investigate the co evolution of asset
prices and agents’ wealth in a stylized market for a long lived  nancial asset populated by an
arbitrary number of heterogeneous agents. We do so under three main assumptions. First,
asset demands are proportional to agents’ wealth. Second, each individual investment behav 
ior can be formalized as a function of past dividends and prices. Third, the asset pays a risky
dividend which follows an exogenous process.
By focusing on asset price dynamics in a market with heterogeneous agents, our paper
clearly belongs to the growing  eld of Heterogeneous Agent Models (HAMs), see Hommes
(2006) for a recent survey. We share the standard set up of this literature and assume that
agents decide whether to invest in a risk free bond or in a risky  nancial asset.1 In the spirit
of Brock and Hommes (1997) and Grandmont (1998) we consider stochastic dynamical system
and analyze the sequence of temporary equilibria of its deterministic skeleton.
As opposed to the majority of HAMs which consider only a few types of investors and
concentrate on heterogeneity in expectations we consider a general framework which can be
applied to a quite large set of investment strategies so that heterogeneity with respect to risk
attitude, expectations, memory and optimization task can be accommodated. We develop the
tools to characterize long run behavior of asset prices and agents’ wealth for a general set of
competing investment strategies. In particular, we can encompass any investment behavior
that can be speci ed as a smooth functions of past realizations of prices and dividends.
An important feature of our model concerns the demand speci cation. In contrast to many
HAMs (see e.g. Brock and Hommes (1998); Gaunersdorfer (2000); Brock et al. (2005)), which
employ the setting where agents’ demand exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (CARA),
we assume that demand increases linearly with agents’ wealth, that is, it exhibits constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA). In such a setting agents a ect market price proportionally
to their relative wealth. As a consequence, relative wealth represents a natural measure of
performance of di erent investment behaviors. On the contrary, in CARA models the wealth
dynamics does not a ect agents’ demand, implying that the performance measure has to be
introduced ad hoc time by time. Furthermore, experimental literature seems to lean in favor
of CRRA rather than CARA (see e.g. Kroll et al. (1988) and Chapter 3 in Levy et al. (2000)).
The analytical exploration of the CRRA framework with heterogeneous agents is di cult
because the wealth dynamics of every agent has to be taken into account. Despite this ob 
stacle, the recent papers of Chiarella and He (2001, 2002), Chiarella et al. (2006), Anufriev
et al. (2006), Anufriev (2008) and Anufriev and Bottazzi (2006), to which our work is par 
ticularly related, have made some progress and are able to characterize the long run market
outcome. All these studies, however, are based on the assumption that the price dividend
ratio is exogenous. This seems at odd with the standard approach, where the dividend pro 
cess is exogenously set, while the asset prices are endogenously determined. In our paper, to
overcome this problem, we analyze a market for a  nancial asset whose dividend process is
exogenous, so that the price dividend ratio is a dynamic variable. Our paper can be seen as
an extension of these works to the case of exogenous dividends.
1Recently, also some models with heterogeneous agents operating in markets with multiple assets (Chiarella
et al., 2007) and with derivatives (Brock et al., 2006) have been developed.
2As a result we show that depending on the di erence between the growth rate of dividends
and the risk free rate, which are the exogenous parameters of our model, the dynamics can
converge to two types of the equilibrium steady states. When the growth rate of dividend is
higher that the risk free rate, the equilibrium dividend yield is positive, asset gives a higher
expected return than the risk free bond, and only one or few investors have positive wealth
share. Only such “survivors” can a ect the price, and in this sence the wealth dynamics acts
as a selection device in a given steady state. However, multiple steady states with di erent
survivors and di erent levels of the dividend yield are possible and the range of possibilities
depends on the whole ecology of traders. Otherwise, when dividends grow less than the risk 
free rate, the dividend yield goes to zero, both the risky asset and the risk free bond give the
same expected return, and the wealth of all agents grows at the same rate as asset prices. We
also show how both type of behaviors simply follow from the process of wealth accumulation
in the economy.
An important reason for departing from previous works with CRRA demands, is that it
allows for a direct application to a well known simulation model. In fact, our CRRA setup
with exogenous dividend process is the set up of one of the  rst agent based simulation model
of a  nancial market introduced by Levy, Levy and Solomon (LLS model, henceforth), see
e.g. Levy et al. (1994). Their work investigates whether some stylized empirical  ndings in
 nance, such as excess volatility or long periods of overvaluation of asset, can be explained
by relaxing the assumption of a fully informed, rational representative agent. Despite some
success of the LLS model in reproducing the  nancial “stylized facts”, all its results are based
on simulations. Our general setup can be applied to the speci c demand schedules used in the
LLS model, and, thus, provides an analytical support to its simulations.
As we are looking at agents’ survival in a  nancial market ecology, our work can be classi ed
within the realm of evolutionary  nance. The seminal work of Blume and Easley (1992), as
well as more recent papers of Sandroni (2000), Hens and Schenk Hopp  e (2005), Blume and
Easley (2006) and Evstigneev et al. (2006), investigate how beliefs about the dividend process
a ect agents’ dominance in the market. There are two main di erences of our work with this
literature. First, whereas their work focuses on portfolio selection, we focus on relating asset
returns to the risk free rate. Indeed, in their model an investor can choose among a number
of di erent risky assets, while in our model agents can invest either in a risky or in a risk less
asset. Second, although these contributions assume that each investment strategy depends
on the realization of exogenous variables, i.e. dividends, our investors can also condition on
past values of endogenous variables such as past prices. As a consequence in our framework
prices today in uence prices tomorrow through their impact on the agents’ demands. This is
important especially when the stability of the surviving strategy is investigated. For instance,
when the investment strategy is too responsive to price movements,  uctuations are typically
ampli ed and unstable price dynamics are produced. Indeed, we show that local stability is
related to how far agents look in the past.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and leads to the de nition
of the stochastic dynamical system where prices and wealths co evolve. The equilibria of the
deterministic version of the system are studied in Section 3 for two simple motivating cases and
in Section 4 for the general case. Section 5 applies the general model to the special case where
agents are mean variance optimizers and explains the simulation results of the LLS model.
Section 6 summarizes our main results and concludes. Proofs are collected in Appendices at
the end of the paper.
32 The model
Let us consider a group of N agents trading in discrete time in a market for a long lived
risky asset. Assume that the asset is in constant supply which, without loss of generality, can
be normalized to 1. Alternatively, agents can buy a risk less asset which returns a constant
interest rate rf > 0. The risk less asset serves as num  eraire with price normalized to 1 in
every period. At time t the risky asset pays a dividend Dt in units of the num  eraire, while its
price Pt is  xed through market clearing.
Let Wn,t stand for the wealth of agent n at time t. It is convenient to express agents’
demand for the risky asset in terms of the fraction xn,t of wealth invested in this asset, so that
agent n invests an amount xn,tWn,t in the risky asset at time t. The dividend is paid before
trade takes place, and the wealth of agent n evolves as










Prices and wealth co evolve because prices depend on current agent wealth via (2.2) and, at
the same time, the wealth of every agent depends on the contemporaneous price via (2.1).
In what follows,  rst, we solve these equations and make the dynamics of prices and wealth
explicit, assuming that dividend process and individual investment decisions are given. Then,
we give a precise speci cation of both investment decisions and dividend process.
2.1 Co evolution of Wealth and Prices
Given asset prices and agents’ wealth at time t, as well as agents’ investment strategies and
the dividend at time t+1, prices and wealth at t+1 are simultaneously determined by wealth
evolution (2.1) and market clearing condition (2.2). To obtain an explicit solution for Pt+1,
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n=1 Wn,t xn,t+1 xn,t
, (2.3)
which using (2.1)  xes the level of individual wealth Wn,t+1 for every agent n. The resulting
expressions can be conveniently written in terms of price return, dividend yield, and each











2Notice that this change of variables changes the nature of steady states equilibria, from constant levels to
constant changes. The latter is more appropriate in an economy which is possibly growing, like ours. For the
same reason, other works in the literature, such as Chiarella and He (2001) and Anufriev et al. (2006), take
the same approach.
4Dividing both sides of (2.3) by Pt and using that Pt =
 
xn,tWn,t, one can rewrite the dynamics
in terms of price returns. This, together with the resulting expression for the evolution of
wealth shares, gives the following system

   
   




(1 + rf)(xn,t+1   xn,t) + yt+1 xn,t xn,t+1
 
ϕn,t  
n xn,t (1   xn,t+1)ϕn,t
,
ϕn,t+1 = ϕn,t
(1 + rf) + (kt+1 + yt+1   rf)xn,t
(1 + rf) + (kt+1 + yt+1   rf)
 
m xm,tϕm,t
, ∀n ∈ {1,...,N}.
(2.4)
According to the  rst equation, returns depend on the totality of agents’ investment decisions
for two consequent periods. High investment fractions for the current period tend to increase
current prices and, hence, returns. This e ect is due to an increase of current demand.
Moreover, the e ect of agents’ decisions on price returns is proportional to their relative
wealth. The second equation shows that the relative wealth of every agent changes according
to the relative investor performances, where the return of each individual wealth should be
taken as performance measure.
2.2 Investment functions
We intend to study the evolution of the asset prices and agents’ wealth while keeping the
investment strategies as general as possible. Therefore we avoid any explicit formulation of
the demand and suppose that the fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset, xn,t, are general
functions of past realizations of prices and dividends. Following Anufriev and Bottazzi (2006)
we formalize this concept of investment strategy as follows.
Assumption 1. For each agent n = 1,...,N there exists an investment function fn which
maps the information set into an investment share:
xn,t = fn(kt 1,kt 2,...,kt L;yt,yt 1,...,yt L). (2.5)
Agents’ investment decisions evolve following individual prescriptions and depend in a
general way on the available information set.3 The investment choices of period t should
be made before trade starts, i.e. when price Pt is still unknown. Thus, the information set
contains past price returns up to kt 1 and past dividend yields up to yt.
Assumption 1 leaves a high freedom in the demand speci cation. The only essential restric 
tions are stationarity, i.e. the same information observed in di erent periods is mapped to the
same investment decision, and that the investment share does not depend on the contempora 
neous wealth of trader. This implies that the demand for the risky asset is linearly increasing
with traders’ wealth. In other words, ceteris paribus investors maintain a constant proportion
of their invested wealth as their wealth level changes. Such behavior can be referred as of a
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) type.4
A number of standard demand speci cations are consistent with Assumption 1. In Sec 
tion 5.1 we will consider agents who maximize mean variance utility of their next period
expected return. Alternatively, one can consider agents behaving in accordance with the
3In order to deal with a  nite dimensional dynamical system, we restrict the memory span of each agent
to a  nite L. Notice however that L can be arbitrarily large.
4The distinction between constant relative and constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) behavior was in 
troduced in Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964), who also relates these concepts with utility maximization. Under
CARA framework agents maintain a constant demand for the risky asset as their wealth changes.
5prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979).5 The generality of the investment func 
tions allows modeling forecasting behavior with a big  exibility too. Formulation (2.5) includes
as special cases both technical trading, e.g., when agents’ decisions are driven by the observed
price  uctuations, and more fundamental attitudes, e.g., when the decisions are made on the
basis of the price dividend ratio. It also includes the case of a constant investment strategy,
which corresponds to agents assuming a stationary ex ante return distribution.
Despite its high generality, our setup does not include a number of important investment
behaviors. Since current wealth is not included as an argument of the investment function,
all the demand functions of CARA type are not covered by our framework. Also the current
price is not among the arguments of (2.5). Therefore, investors deriving their investment share
conditional on the current price cannot be reconciled with our setup.
2.3 Dividend process
The last ingredient of the model is the dividend process. The previous analytical models built
in a similar framework, such as Chiarella and He (2001), Anufriev et al. (2006), Anufriev
and Bottazzi (2006) and Anufriev (2008), assume that the dividend yield is an i.i.d. process.
This implies that any change in the level of price causes an immediate change in the level
of dividends. In reality, however, the dividend policy of  rms is hardly so fast responsive to
the performance of  rm assets, especially when prices are driven up by speculative bubbles.
Both for the sake of reality and for comparison to previous works, we  nd it interesting to
investigate what happens when the dividend process is an exogenous process. This is the
approach we take in this paper.
Assumption 2. The dividend realization follows a geometric random walk,
Dt = Dt 1 (1 + gt),
where the growth rate, gt, is an i.i.d. random variable.





Equations (2.4), (2.5) and (2.6) specify the evolution of the asset market with N heteroge 
neous agents. The dynamics of the model is stochastic due to the  uctuations of the dividend
process. Following the typical route in the literature (cf. Brock and Hommes (1997), Grand 
mont (1998)), in the next two sections we analyze the deterministic skeleton of this stochastic
dynamics. The skeleton is obtained by  xing the growth rate of dividends gt at the constant
level g. Later in this paper we show that the local stability analysis of the deterministic skele 
ton gives a considerable insight into the analysis of stochastic simulations, performed with gt
as a random variable.6
5This is shown, for instance, in Chapter 9 of Levy et al. (2000).
6It is important to keep in mind that the agents do take the risk due to randomness into account, when
deriving their investment functions. Given agents’ behavior, we, as the modelers, set the noise level to zero
and analyze the resulting deterministic dynamics.
63 Two special cases
Before analyzing the general model, it is informative to consider some simple examples. In this
section we assume that agent investment decisions are a ected only by the last observation of
price return and dividend yield. For such speci cation we study and compare the situations
with one or two agents trading in the market. The main purpose of these simpli cations is to
get an overview of the di erent possibilities which our model can generate and get an insight
into its dynamics and underlying economic mechanisms. A careful mathematical analysis,
with all computations and proofs, is postponed to Section 4, where we investigate the general
case.
3.1 Single agent
The simplest situation is the single agent case, when wealth evolution can be ignored. Equa 
tions (2.4)–(2.6) give altogether the market dynamics which, omitting the agent speci c sub 
index, can be written as

     
     
xt+1 = f(kt,yt+1),
kt+1 = rf +
(1 + rf)(xt+1   xt) + yt+1 xt xt+1







The steady states of the dynamics correspond to the constant values x , k  and y .
Assume,  rst, that the dividend yield y  is positive. To sustain constant yield, the prices
should grow with the same rate as the dividend. Indeed, k  = g from the last equation of
(3.1). Substitution to the  rst two equations leads to
x
  = f(g;y
 ) and x
  =
g   rf
y  + g   rf
, (3.2)
which, g and rf being exogenous, represents a system of two equations in two variables, the
investment share x  and the dividend yield y . When the investment function is speci ed
any solution of this system completes the computation of the steady states. Both equations
in (3.2) de ne a one dimensional curve in coordinates (y,x), so that solutions can be found
graphically as the intersections of the two curves. The  rst curve, which will be referred as the
Equilibrium Investment Function (EIF), is a cross section of the investment function f(k,y)
by the plane k = g. For any value of the dividend yield y, the EIF gives the agent’s investment
share corresponding to this yield, and consistent with the condition of constant yield (i.e. with
prices growing at rate g). The second curve,
l(y) =
g   rf
y + g   rf
, (3.3)
de ned for y > 0, is called the Equilibrium Market Curve (EMC). For any y, it determines
an investment share necessary for generating the endogenous prices growing at rate g. At the
steady state, where (3.2) holds and the curves intersect, the agent invests as much as needed to
generate the constant yield economy (since the point belongs to the EMC) and his investment
is consistent with his own investment function (since the point belongs to the EIF).
7In the left panel of Fig. 1 the EMC is drawn as a thick curve, with one example of EIF
shown as a thin curve. From our discussion it follows that the steady states of (3.1) are the
intersections of the EMC with the EIF, in this case points A and B. Only here the investment
behavior is consistent with market clearing, constant returns, and constant dividend yields. In
point A the agent invests a high proportion of his wealth in the risky asset. Such investment
behavior pushes the price up and leads to a low yield. In point B the investment share is
lower, leading to a higher yield.
FIGURE 1 IS ABOUT HERE.
The previous discussion concerned the case with positive steady state yield. When the
dividend yield y  = 0, the second equation of (3.1) implies that k  = rf, and the investment
share is unambiguously determined as x  = f(rf,0). In this case we have a unique steady state
equilibrium.7
To summarize, the dynamics of (3.1) may generate two types of steady states. The  rst
type has k  = g, while the dividend yield and investment share are determined simultaneously.
From the EMC plot it is clear that for a given trader’s behavior, there could be none, one or
multiple steady states. The second type has always a unique steady state with zero dividend
yield, k  = rf, and investment share x  = f(rf,0).
Local Stability. Since multiple steady states can exist in the model, the question of their
local stability becomes very important. The  rst conclusion is that for given parameters g
and rf the steady states of only one type can be stable, and, therefore, observable. In fact,
in the steady state of the  rst type one of the eigenvalues is equal to (1 + rf)/(1 + g), while
in all the steady states of the second type one of the eigenvalues is equal to (1 + g)/(1 + rf),
which is exactly the inverse. For instance, if g > rf only the steady states with positive yield
can be stable. To understand this result we note that it is equivalent to the fact that in the
stable steady states the price return k  is equal to maximum of g and rf. In our economy new
money (and therefore wealth) is continuously arriving both through dividends and interest
payment. When the economy converges to a steady state, the long run rate of growth of the
total wealth is determined by the fastest among these two sources and the price return of the
risky asset simply re ect this growth of the num  eraire.
The dynamics have two other eigenvalues, which has to be identi ed in order to complete
the stability analysis. In the case of type one steady states these other two eigenvalues are
the roots of
 













y  , (3.4)
where l′ denotes the slope of the EMC, and fk and fy stand for the partial derivatives of
the investment function with respect to the past price return and the past dividend yield,
respectively, all computed in the corresponding steady state. Thus, the steady state with
positive yield is locally stable if g > rf and the two roots of polynomial (3.4) lie inside the
unit circle. In particular, it is the relative slope of the investment function with respect to the
7Notice that the steady state with zero dividend yield can be observed only asymptotically, since dividends
are positive. The reader can  nd more on this point in Section 4.
8EMC at the steady state which is crucial for stability. For example, when multiple steady 
states are present (as for agent I in the left panel of Fig. 1), some of the steady state can be
stable and some not.
When g < rf the only candidate for stability is the zero yield steady state. This steady 
state is locally stable if both roots of polynomial
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1 + rf




x (1   x )
f
k (3.5)
lie inside the unit circle. The slope of the investment function as well as the level of investment
share determine stability of this steady state.
3.2 Two agents
The case of two co existing agents is more interesting because the relative wealth dynamics
starts to play a role. Using (2.4)–(2.6) we obtain

             












(1 + rf) + (kt+1 + yt+1   rf)x1,t
(1 + rf) + (kt+1 + yt+1   rf)(ϕ1,t x1,t + ϕ2,t x2,t)
,




(1 + rf)(xn,t+1   xn,t) + yt+1 xn,t xn,t+1
 
ϕn,t







A steady state of the market dynamics consists of constant values of the two investment shares
(x 
1 and x 
2), constant wealth distribution (ϕ 
1 and ϕ 
2 = 1   ϕ 
1), and constant levels of price
returns and dividend yields (k  and y ).
We start with the  rst type of steady states, those with positive y . Again this leads to
k  = g and, from the wealth dynamics, we obtain that the investment share of any agent
with positive wealth share is equal to ϕ 
1x 
1 + ϕ 
2x 
2. Let us call “survivor” an agent whose
wealth share is positive in a given steady state. Then we have just established the fact that
all survivors have the same investment share in a steady state. Given this, two possibilities
can arise. If only one agent, say the  rst, survives, which implies ϕ 
1 = 1, then his investment




 ) and x
 
1 =
g   rf
y  + g   rf
, (3.7)
which is the same system of equations as (3.2). Thus, again, the EMC plot provides the
geometric characterization, with steady state values (y ,x 
1) given by the coordinates of inter 
section of the EMC with the EIF of the  rst agent. The second agent has zero wealth share
and invests according to his investment function x 
2 = f2(g,y ). Another possibility arises
when both agents survive, i.e., ϕ 












g   rf
y  + g   rf
, (3.8)
9that is, both agents have to invest the same fraction of wealth in the risky asset. Since the
wealth share ϕ 
1 is free of choice, in this case there exists an in nite number of the steady states,
a continuum manifold of them to be precise. Indeed, any wealth distribution corresponds to
a di erent steady state, though the levels of k  and y  are the same in all of them.
The right panel of Fig. 1 gives a speci c example of positive yield equilibria. The EIF of
agents I and II are plotted as the thin lines I and II respectively. All possible steady states
of the dynamics are the intersections between these curves and the EMC. There exist three
steady states marked by points A, B and C. Point A corresponds to the case where (3.7) is
satis ed for agent I. Therefore, in this steady state he survives and, being alone, takes all
available wealth, ϕ 
I = 1. As in the single agent case, the equilibrium dividend yield y  is the
abscissa of point A, while the investment share of the survivor, x 
I, is the ordinate of A. The
equilibrium investment share of the second agent, x 
II, can be found as a value of his investment
function at y . In the other two steady states the variables are determined in a similar way.
In particular, agent I is the only survivor at B, while at C only the second agent survives. To
illustrate a situation with in nity of steady states, imagine to shift curve II upward so that
points C and A coincide. This would be a situation with two survivors. In fact when the
two EIF intersect the EMC in the same point, system (3.8) is satis ed. Any di erent wealth
distribution (i.e. all possible combinations of ϕI and ϕII satisfying to ϕI + ϕII = 1) de nes
a di erent steady state. However, every steady state must have the same yield and the same
investment share for both agents as determined by the coordinates of point A C. Since it is
unlikely that two generic investment functions intersect the EMC at the same point, we refer
to such case of coexisting survivors as non generic.
The second type of steady states have zero yield. If y  = 0 we derive from (3.6) that
k  = rf and the investment shares are uniquely determined from the investment functions.
Now, however, the zero yield steady state is not unique, because any wealth distribution
determines steady state. In all of them, however, the aggregate economic variables (the price
return and dividend yield) are the same. Therefore, such steady states are indistinguishable
when looking at the aggregate time series.
To summarize, as in a single agent case there are two types of the steady states. In
the steady states of the  rst type k  = g, the yield is positive, and all the agents with
positive wealth shares (“survivors”) have the same investment share. This share is determined
simultaneously with the dividend yield as the coordinates of an intersection of the EMC with
the EIF of the survivor(s). Generically there is one survivor in each steady state, but if the
EIF of the two agents intersect in a point which also belongs to the EMC, there exist an
in nite number of the steady states, corresponding to any wealth distribution between the
two agents. In the steady states of the second type the yield is zero, k  = rf, and, the agents
invest according to their investment functions. Any wealth distribution of agents is allowed,
so that there exists an in nite number of such steady states.
Local Stability. Consider,  rst, the steady states with positive yield. When only one agent
(say, the  rst) survives, the Jacobian matrix of system (3.6) has one zero eigenvalue, one
eigenvalue equal to
1 + rf + (g + y    rf)x 
2
1 + rf + (g + y    rf)x 
1
, (3.9)
and three other eigenvalues which are the same as for the single agent system (3.1) with in 
vestment function f1. Thus, the stability conditions can be divided into two parts. First, the
10eigenvalue (3.9) should be inside the unit circle, which is equivalent to condition x 
1 > x 
2.
Second, the same steady state should be stable for a lower dimensional, “reduced” system,
which is obtained from the original one by eliminating the agent who does not survive. Ac 
cording to Section 3.1 the reduced system is locally stable when (i) g > rf and (ii) both roots
of polynomial
 

















y  , (3.10)
lie inside the unit circle. In this polynomial fk
1 and f
y
1 are the partial derivatives of the
investment function of the survivor at the steady state. As for the condition x 
1 > x 
2, it means
that the survivor should behave more “aggressively” in the stable steady state, i.e. invest more
in the risky asset, than the agent who does not survive. This result is a consequence of wealth 
based selection inherent to the dynamics of our model. As long as the risky asset yields a
higher average return than the riskless asset, the most aggressive agent has also the highest
individual return. Consider the steady state where the survivor with ϕ 
1 = 1 invests smaller
share than the second agent. Consider now a deviation from such steady state when small
relative wealth redistributed in favor of the second agent. As soon as the second agent has
positive wealth, he will get higher return and faster growing wealth. Thus, the dynamics will
not return to the initial steady state.8 With respect to the example in the right hand panel of
Fig. 1, the stability analysis implies that steady states B and C are unstable. At B investor I
is the survivor, but in this steady state investor II invests more. The same is in C, where the
survivor (agent II) is less aggressive than the other agent.
In the non generic situation, when both agents survive, there exists a manifold of the
steady states with positive yield. Any of them is identi ed by some wealth distributions
(ϕ 
1,ϕ 
2). The conditions for local stability of such steady state are (i) g > rf and (ii) all the
roots of polynomial
 




























lie within the unit circle. This polynomial explicitly depends on the wealth distribution at
the steady state. As a result it can happen that steady states with the same values of k , y 
and x , are stable for some wealth distributions and unstable for others. Notice that (3.11)
coincides with (3.10) at the steady state where only the  rst agent survives.
Finally, we turn to the steady states of the second type, with zero yield. There exists a
manifold of them, but in all these steady states there are eigenvalues 0, 1 and (1 + g)/(1 + rf).
While the unit eigenvalue corresponds to the directions of the change in wealth distribution,
the last eigenvalues provides condition g < rf for stability. Finally, the remaining eigenvalues
are the roots of polynomial
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2 stay for the partial derivatives of the two investment functions in the steady 
states. When there is only one survivor (e.g., ϕ 
1 = 1), this polynomial coincides with (3.5).
Thus, the stability conditions in the case of the two agents generalize those of the single
8We have de ned a survivor as an agent with positive wealth share at the steady state. Obviously, if this
steady state is unstable, one cannot observe asymptotically the survivance of survivor.
11agent case. Notice that the characteristic polynomial (3.12) explicitly depends on the wealth
distribution.
Let us summarize our results and intuition behind them. One feature of our model, the
in ow of the num  eraire from dividends and risk less return, implies that the steady states
with constant values of return and wealth shares can only be stable when prices grow with a
rate equal to max(g,rf). When g > rf the dynamics are consistent with a positive dividend
yield, implying positive excess return of the risky asset. In this case the second feature of our
model starts to play its role. Namely, in our CRRA framework, wealth dynamics rewards more
aggressive agents having higher investment shares. Such wealth driven selection of agents is
responsible for the fact that only few agents (behaving identically) can survive in the steady 
state. On the other hand, when g < rf one has zero excess return, and the wealth selection
is not “activated”. In fact, every investment strategy gives the same return. As a result, a
variety of investment behaviors can be observed at the steady state. In addition to these two
forces, i.e. monetary expansion and wealth selection, the investment behavior itself a ects the
stability of the di erent steady states. In line with the HAM literature, we  nd that investment
functions should be  at enough in a neighborhood of steady states (implicitly this is implied
by conditions on the roots of polynomials (3.10)–(3.12)). Otherwise, small deviations of price
returns or dividend yield will be ampli ed by agents behavior.
It turns out that, generally speaking, all these results do not change much in the case of
arbitrary number of agents with more general behavior. This is demonstrated in the next
section.
4 Equilibrium returns and agent survival
In this section we address the equilibrium and stability analysis of our market dynamics in
full generality, that is, we consider a market populated by N investors each trading according
to a di erent investment function.








where the time of the decision, t, and the time of the weighting wealth distribution, s, can
be di erent. Applying this notation to (2.4)–(2.6), the deterministic skeleton of the market
dynamics with N investors can be written as

            
            
xn,t+1 = fn
 
kt,kt 1,...,kt L+1;yt+1,yt,...,yt L+1
 
, ∀n ∈ {1,...,N}
ϕn,t+1 = ϕn,t
(1 + rf) + (kt+1 + yt+1   rf)xn,t





, ∀n ∈ {1,...,N}
kt+1 = rf +
(1 + rf)
 
















Given the arbitrariness of the population size N, of the memory span L, and the absence of
any speci cation for the investment functions, the analysis of the dynamics generated by (4.2)
12is highly non trivial in its general formulation. However, the constraints on the dynamics set
by the dividend process, the market clearing equation and the wealth evolution are su cient
to (i) uniquely characterize the steady state equilibrium level of price returns, (ii) describe
the corresponding possible distributions of wealth among agents, and (iii) restrict the possible
values of steady state equilibria dividend yields to a low dimensional set. Moreover it is
possible to derive general conditions under which convergence to these equilibria is guaranteed.
The primary issue is whether restricting the dynamics to the set of economically relevant
values delivers a well de ned dynamical system. In particular, positivity of prices and divi 
dends imply that price returns should always exceed  1 and dividend yields should always be
larger than 0. The following result shows that at this purpose it is su cient to forbid investors
to take short positions.
Proposition 4.1. Assume that agents do not take short positions in both the risk less and the
risky assets, or using an investment functions fn as de ned in Ass. 1, assume that
the image of fn belongs to (0,1) for every n. (4.3)
Then the system (4.2) de nes a 2N+2L dimensional dynamical system of  rst order equations.
The evolution operator associated with this system
T(x1,...,xN;ϕ1,...,ϕN;k1,...,kL;y1,...,yL) (4.4)
is well de ned on the set
D = (0,1)
N    N   ( 1,∞)
L   (0,∞)
L , (4.5)
consisting respectively of the investment shares, the wealth shares, the (lagged) price returns





m=1 ϕm = 1, ϕm   0 ∀m
 
.
Proof. We prove that the dynamics from D to D is well de ned. The explicit evolution
operator T, which is used in the stability analysis, is provided in Appendix A.
Let us start with period t variables belonging to the domain D and apply the dynamics
described by (4.2) to them. Since kt >  1, the fourth equation is well de ned and yt+1 is
positive. As a result, the  rst equation de nes the new investment shares belonging to (0,1)
in accordance with the assumption in (4.3). It, in turn, implies that in the right hand side of
the third equation all the variables are de ned, and the denominator is positive. Thus, kt+1
can be computed. Moreover, the denominator does not exceed 1, as a convex combination of
numbers non exceeding 1. Then, a simple computation gives




(1 + rf)( 1) + 0
 
ϕm,t =  1.
Finally, it is easy to see that both the numerator and the denominator of the second equation
are positive and that
 
m ϕm,t+1 = 1. Therefore, the dynamics of the wealth shares is well 
de ned and takes place within the unit simplex  N.
The proposition shows that given any initial conditions for (4.2), the dynamics of price returns,
dividend yields and relative wealth shares are completely speci ed. One can now easily derive
the dynamics of price and wealth levels as well, but only if the initial price and the initial
13wealth of agents are given. In addition to proving the existence of a well de ned map,9
Proposition 4.1 also shows that when short positions are forbidden, agents’ wealth shares are
bounded between 0 and 1. This makes sense because only short investment positions can give
rise to a negative wealth for some agents. Throughout the remaining part of this paper we
impose the no short selling condition (4.3).
4.1 Location of steady state equilibria
In a steady state, aggregate economic variables, such as price returns and dividend yields, are
constant and will be denoted by k  and y , respectively.10 Every steady state has also constant
investment shares (x 
1,...,x 
n), and wealth distribution (ϕ 
1,...,ϕ 
n). Concerning the latter we
introduce the following de nition.




N;k ;y ) an agent n is
said to survive if his wealth share is strictly positive, ϕ 
n > 0.
In every state of the economy there exists at least one survivor. In a steady state with M
surviving agents (1   M   N) we will always assume that the  rst M agents are those who
survive.
The characterization of all possible steady states of the dynamical system de ned on the
set D is given below.
Proposition 4.2. Steady state equilibria of the dynamical system (4.2) evolving on the set D
exist only when the dividend growth rate g is larger than the interest rate rf.




N;k ;y ) be a steady state of (4.2). Then:
  The steady state price return is equal to the growth rate of dividends, k  = g;
  All surviving agents have the same investment share x 
 , which together with the steady 




g   rf
y  + g   rf
. (4.6)
  The steady state wealth shares satisfy
 
ϕ 
m ∈ (0,1] if m   M
ϕ 






m = 1. (4.7)
Proof. See Appendix B.
We have established that a steady state can only exist when g > rf. This result begs
a question of what happens in the opposite case, when the dividend growth rate is smaller
than rf. It turns out that when g < rf the dynamics converges to a point where y  =
0 which, formally, does not belong to the domain D de ned in (4.5). We postpone the
formal analysis of these situations, which we have already encountered in the examples of
9With some abuse of language we usually refer to (4.2) and not to the  rst order map T in (4.4) as “the
dynamical system”. The explicit map T will be used only in the proofs.
10Notice that in the steady state all L lagged values of the return and yield, which were introduced to de ne
the evolution operator T, are equal to their contemporaneous values, i.e. to k  and y .
14Section 3, to Section 4.3. For the moment just assume that g > rf. Then many situations
are possible, including the cases with no steady state, with multiple steady states, and with
di erent number of survivors in the same steady state.
Above all notice that in all the steady state equilibria the price grows at the same rate as
the dividend, which is a consequence of requiring a constant dividend yield. In contrast, the
steady state level of dividend yield depends on agent behaviors. Proposition 4.2 implies that
the dividend yield, y , and the investment share of survivors, x 
 , are determined simultaneously
by (4.6). At the same time, the investment share x 
  is given by the value of the agent’s
investment function at the steady state. Using the Equilibrium Market Curve (EMC) l(y)
de ned in (3.3), equation (4.6) can be rewritten as the following system of M equations
l(y





∀ 1   m   M . (4.8)
The right hand side of this relation represents the Equilibrium Investment Function (EIF) of
survivor m, i.e. the cross section of his investment function by the set
 
kt = kt 1 =     = kt L+1 = g; yt+1 = yt =     = yt L+1 = y
 
. (4.9)
In Fig. 1 we have already shown how the condition (4.8) can be expressed graphically. Namely,
all possible pairs (y ,x 
 ) can be found as the intersections of the EMC with each EIF. The
EMC plot is an useful graphical tool that can be used to illustrate di erent long run market
dynamics. It is possible that the dynamics do not possess any steady state (if no investment
function intersects the EMC). It is also possible that the system possesses multiple steady 
states with di erent levels of dividend yield, as well as multiple steady states with the same
level of yield. Despite encompassing quite a rich range of possibilities, the EMC plot also shows
that the often heard conjecture that, in the world of heterogeneous agents, “anything goes”
is not necessarily valid. Even when the strategies of agents are generic, as in our framework,
the market plays its role in shaping the aggregate outcome. The steady states of system (4.2)
can lie only on the EMC, which is a small subset of the original domain. The shape of the
EMC is entirely determined by the exogenous parameters of the model, as g and rf, and does
not depend on agents’ behaviors.
To complete the discussion of the steady states on the EMC curve, notice that “more
aggressive” behavior in the steady state (i.e. investment of larger wealth fraction to the risky
asset) implies smaller dividend yield. More aggressive behavior pushes the demand up, and
leads to larger price level, which decreases the dividend yield. Does it imply that aggressive
behavior is harmful for the investor’s return? Rather surprisingly, the answer is no. From
(4.6) the steady state excess return is given by
g + y
    rf =




Even if it decreases in the investment level, the agent’s return is given by multiple x  of it.
This implies
Corollary 4.1. At any steady state equilibrium described in Proposition 4.2, the wealth return
of each surviving agent is equal to g.
Thus, even if di erent steady states have di erent survivors and di erent yields, all of them
are welfare equivalent. Corollary 4.1 sheds light on the nature of the EMC. It is nothing but the
locus of yield investment share points where wealth returns, which are a convex combination
of risky and risk less returns, are all equal to g. Were steady states not located on the EMC
then total wealth would grow at an arbitrary di erent rate, which is not possible since the
in ow of money in the economy is exogenously  xed and equal to g = max(g,rf).
154.2 Stability analysis
We turn now to the characterization of the local stability conditions for the steady states found
in Proposition 4.2. At this purpose we assume that all the investment functions entering into
the dynamics (4.2) are di erentiable at their steady states.
4.2.1 Wealth driven selection
The steady states identi ed in Proposition 4.2 are characterized by a positive excess return.
It allows the market to play the role of a natural selecting force. In fact, trading rewards some
agents at the expense of others, shaping in this way the long run wealth distribution. The  rst
part of our stability analysis focuses on this “natural selection” mechanism. The following
general result holds.
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de 
scribed in Proposition 4.2, where the  rst M agents survive and invest x 
 . It is (locally) stable
if the following two conditions are met:





  ∀m ∈ {M + 1,...,N}. (4.10)
2) the steady state
 
x 
1   x 
 ,...,x 
M   x 
 ;ϕ 
1,...,ϕ 
M;k ;y  
of the reduced system, ob 
tained by elimination of all the non surviving agents from the economy, is locally stable.
The system generically exhibits a fold bifurcation when the rightmost inequality in (4.10)
becomes an equality, and it exhibits a  ip bifurcation if the leftmost inequality in (4.10) becomes
an equality.
Proof. To derive the stability conditions, the (2N + 2L)   (2N + 2L) Jacobian matrix of
the system has to be computed and evaluated at the steady state11. For the stability of the
system, the eigenvalues of this Jacobian should be inside the unit circle. In Appendix C we
show that condition 1) is necessary and su cient to guarantee that M eigenvalues of the
Jacobian matrix lie inside the unit circle. Among the other eigenvalues there will be M zeros.
Finally, all the remaining eigenvalues can be derived from the Jacobian associated with the
“reduced” dynamical system, i.e. without non surviving agents, evaluated in the steady state.
This implies condition 2).
This proposition gives an important necessary condition for stability. Namely, the invest 
ment shares of the non surviving agents must satisfy (4.10). In other words, the survivors
should invest more in the risky asset than those who do not survive. We have illustrated
this fact in the left panel of Fig. 2. At the stable equilibrium the investment shares of the
non surviving agents should belong to the gray area, i.e. lie below the investment shares of
survivors. Given the investment function of I and II, only A could possibly be stable.
FIGURE 2 IS ABOUT HERE.
11General references on the modern treatment of stability and bifurcation theory in discrete time dynamical
systems are Medio and Lines (2001) and Kuznetsov (2004).
164.2.2 Stability of equilibria with survivors
According to condition 2) in Proposition 4.3, when (4.10) is satis ed, the non survivors can
be eliminated from the market. The dynamics can then be described by the reduced system,
that is, the same system (4.2) but with only M agents, all investing the same, as if there is
a representative investor. When is the corresponding steady state equilibrium stable? The
general answer to this question is quite complicated, because the stability depends upon the
behavior of the survivors in a small neighborhood of the steady state, i.e. on the slopes of
their investment functions. More precisely, we shall see that the stability is determined by
the average values of partial derivatives of agent investment functions weighted by the agent
equilibrium wealth shares.






M;k ;y  
and denote the vector of lagged
returns and yields as e∗ = (k ,...,k ;y ,...,y ). In the notation below index m = 1,...,N
and index l = 0,...,L   1. Denote the derivative of the investment function fm with respect
to the contemporaneous dividend yield as fY
m, the derivative with respect to the dividend
yield of lag l + 1 as fyl, and the derivative with respect to the price return of lag l + 1 as fkl.





































which are the weighted derivatives of the investment functions evaluated at the steady state.
Finally, l′(y ) is the slope of the EMC at the steady state equilibrium y . The next result
reduces the stability problem to the exploration of the roots of a certain polynomial.
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, described in Proposition
4.2, with M survivors is locally stable if all the roots of the polynomial
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lie inside the unit circle. If, in addition, only one agent survives, then the steady state is
locally asymptotically stable.
The steady state is unstable if at least one of the roots of polynomial Q( ) is outside the
unit circle.
Proof. See Appendix D.
When the investment functions are speci ed, this proposition provides a de nite answer to
the question about stability of a given steady state. One has to evaluate the polynomial (4.11)
in this steady state and compute (e.g. numerically) all its L + 1 roots. Despite not providing
explicit stability conditions, Proposition 4.4 reduces the complexity of the problem. In fact,
whereas the characteristic polynomial of the dynamical system (4.2) has dimension 2N + 2L,
we are left to the analysis of a polynomial of degree L + 1. Moreover, Proposition 4.4 allows
us to get some insights about the determinants of stability. For example, when the investment
functions of all survivors are neither responsive to a change in the yield nor to a change in
the return (i.e. all the derivatives of the investment functions are 0 in the steady state), the
expression in parenthesis becomes zero and the stability condition is obviously satis ed. Using
a continuity argument, this also implies that the steady state is stable if the relative average
slopes of the investment functions are small enough with respect to the slope of the EMC.
17Recall that in the case with many survivors, there exists a set of steady states corresponding
to di erent distributions of wealth among survivors. Since the stability conditions depend
on the partial derivatives of the investment functions weighted with the equilibrium relative
wealth shares, some of the steady states on the same manifold (i.e. with the same dividend
yield and investment share) can be stable, while other can be unstable. Finally, notice that
both polynomials (3.4) and (3.11) are the special cases of Q( ).
4.2.3 An example with investment conditioned on the total return
Let us characterize the stability for a special case that is important for the applications de 
veloped in Section 5. Suppose that the investment functions depend on the average of past
L total returns, given by the sum of price returns and dividend yields. For example investors
might use this average as a forecast of future returns and invest a generic function of this












Plugging in (4.11) and simplifying, it leads to
˜ Q( ) =  
L+1  
1 +   +     +  L 1
L
 
1 + (1    )
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The only unknown part of the polynomial ˜ Q( ) is its last fraction, which is relative slope
between the survivor “average” investment function and the EMC, both evaluated at the at
the steady state. Its role in determining stability is still implicit. When L = 1 this requirement
can be made explicit.
Corollary 4.2. Consider a steady state of the system (4.2) with investment functions (4.12)
and lag L = 1, where all the non survivors have been eliminated. The steady state is locally
stable if
 y 
1 + g + y  <
 





y  + 2(1 + g)
. (4.14)
The steady state generically exhibits  ip or Neimark Sacker bifurcation if the right  or left 
most inequality in (4.14) turns to equality, respectively.
Proof. This follows from standard conditions for the roots of second degree polynomial to be
inside the unit circle. See appendix E for the details.




The steady state is stable if the corresponding point belongs to the dark grey area. From the
diagram it is clear that the dynamics are stable for a low (in absolute value) relative slope  
f′ 
/l′ at the steady state.
How does the stability depend on the memory span L? A mixture of analytic and numeric
tools help to reveal the behavior of the roots of polynomial (4.13) with higher L. The stability
conditions for L = 2, derived in Appendix E, can be confronted with the L = 1 case, see the
right panel of Fig. 2. An increase of the memory span L from 1 to 2 enlarges the stability
region. This result comes at no surprise, since as agents look further back, any recent shock
in price or return gets smaller impact on their behavior. For further increase of the memory
span the following result holds
18Corollary 4.3. Consider a steady state of the system (4.2) with investment functions (4.12),
where all the non survivors have been eliminated. Provided that
 




the corresponding steady state is locally stable for high enough L.
To summarize, if L is  nite and low, the system can be stabilized by decreasing the average
slope of survivor investment functions with respect to the slope of the EMC. Furthermore, if
inequality (4.15) holds, an increase of memory span always stabilizes the system.
4.3 Zero yield equilibria
So far we have dealt with economies where dividends grow faster than the risk free rate rf. In
fact, according to Proposition 4.2, only in this case there exist steady states equilibria. One
may wonder what happens when dividends grow, on average, more slowly than rf. We shall
see that in this case prices tend to grow faster than dividends, so that the dividend yield goes
to zero. Formally however y = 0 cannot be a point of our domain, because dividends and
prices are always positive. It is now clear that the reason why in Proposition 4.2 we did not
 nd any steady state when g < rf is very simple. Since the domain D given in (4.5) is not a
closed set, the dynamics can easily converge to a point which at its boundary, as y = 0.
Let us, therefore, extend our formal analysis of the dynamics on the set
D
′ = (0,1)
N    N   [ 1,∞)
L   [0,∞)
L . (4.16)
It turns out that (4.2) has a well de ned dynamics also on D′. In this way we are able to
characterize possible asymptotical converge to a steady state equilibrium with zero dividend
yield. The next result applies.
Proposition 4.5. Consider the dynamical system (4.2) evolving on the set D′ introduced
in (4.16) and assume that the no short selling constraint (4.3) is satis ed. Apart from the





N;k ;y ) where:
  The price return is equal to the risk free rate, k  = rf.
  The dividend yield is zero, y  = 0.
  The wealth shares satisfy
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m ∈ (0,1] if m   M
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m = 1. (4.17)
Proof. See Appendix F.
Contrary to the steady state equilibria with positive dividend yield, in the steady states
derived in Proposition 4.5, the total return of the asset, k  + y , coincides with rf.
Corollary 4.4. At any steady state equilibrium with y  = 0 as found in Proposition 4.5, the
wealth return of each agent is equal to rf.
19At these steady states, therefore, there is no di erence between the return on investment
of the risky and risk less asset. As a result all investment strategies are equivalent and any
wealth distribution can be a steady state. As opposed to the steady states with positive yield
survivors may behave di erently, i.e. homogeneous behavior is not necessary but, similarly,
the dividend and price dynamics is set by the representative investor.
The local stability of the steady state equilibria with zero dividend yield can be analyzed
along the same lines of Proposition 4.3 and leads to
Proposition 4.6. Steady states of the dynamical system (4.2) evolving on the set D′ can be
stable only if g < rf.
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be a  xed point of (4.2) with y  = 0.
This point is locally stable if all the roots of the polynomial
Q0( ) =  
L+1 +
1 + rf  
x (1   x )







L 1 l (4.18)
lie inside the unit circle.
The steady state is unstable if at least one of the roots of the polynomial Q0( ) is outside
the unit circle.
Proof. See Appendix G.
In the special cases of a one or two agents, the polynomial Q0( ) simpli es to (3.5) and
(3.12), respectively.
5 An example with mean variance optimizers
In this section we analyze the co evolution of price returns, dividend yields and wealth shares
for a speci c set of agents’ investment behaviors. We consider agents who are allocating wealth
between the risky and the risk less asset as to maximize a one period ahead mean variance
utility. We assume that agents’ expectations of future variables are computed using averages
of past observations, as in Section 4.2.3. Agents are heterogeneous with respect to memory
span and risk aversion.
We proceed along two lines. First, we perform simulations of the system when the growth
rate of dividends is stochastic and explain them using results from 4. Second, we apply the
same tools to the analysis of a related model, the LLS model introduced in Levy et al. (1994).
As a result, we are able to resolve some puzzles put forward by Zschischang and Lux (2001)
regarding the interplay between risk aversion and memory span in the simulations of the LLS
model.
5.1 Mean variance optimizers
Throughout this section it is assumed that the growth rates of the dividends is
gt = (1 + g) t   1,
where log( t) are i.i.d. normal random variables with mean 0 and variance  2
g. Assumption 2
on the dividend process is satis ed, and in the deterministic skeleton the dividend grows with
rate g. For the moment let us further assume that g > rf.
20Agents maximize the mean variance utility of the next period total return




where Et and Vt denote, respectively, the mean and the variance conditional on the information
available at time t, and   is the coe cient of risk aversion. Assuming constant expected
variance Vt =  2, the investment fraction which maximizes U is
xt =
Et[kt+1 + yt+1   rf]
  2 . (5.1)
Agents estimate the next period return as the average of L past realized returns. Following
condition (4.3), i.e. forbidding short positions, we bound the investment shares in the interval
[0.01,0.99]. Summing up, an investment function with parameters   =   2 and L is










 =1(kt   + yt  )   rf
   
, (5.2)
where   is the “normalized” risk aversion and L is the memory span. These are the two
parameters that di er across agents.
FIGURE 3 IS ABOUT HERE.
To derive all possible equilibria we  x  2
g = 0 and turn to the deterministic skeleton. Let
the price return k  be equal to g, and consider the EIF derived from (5.2)









This is shown by the thin curve on the bottom right panel of Fig. 3. All the steady state
equilibria can be found as the intersections of the EIF with the EMC. Notice that (5.3) does
not depend on L, that is the memory span does not in uence the location of the steady states.
Geometrically, all the multi dimensional investment functions di ered only in L collapse onto
the same EIF. Analytically the steady state equilibria with a single investor can be derived
from Proposition 4.2. We obtain
Corollary 5.1. Consider the system (4.2) with g > rf and with a single agent investing
according to (5.2). There exists a unique steady state equilibrium (x ,k ,y ) and it is charac 




 (g   rf)   (g   rf), x
  =
 
g   rf
 
. (5.4)
The bottom right panel of Fig. 3 illustrates this result. The market has a unique steady 
state, A , whose abscissa, y , is the dividend yield, and whose ordinate, x , is the investment
share. The position of this steady state depends on the (normalized) risk aversion coe cient
 . It is immediate to see that when   increases, the line x = (y+g rf)/  rotates clockwise, so
that the steady state dividend yield increases, while the investment share decreases. Eq. (5.4)
con rms it, as ∂y /∂  > 0 and ∂x /∂  < 0.
21What are the determinants of stability of the steady state equilibrium A ? First of all,
notice that we can apply the stability analysis of Section 4.2.3, because the investment function
f ,L is of the type speci ed in (4.12). The stability, therefore, is determined both by the
memory span L and by the ratio of the slopes of the function ˜ f  and the EMC in the point
A . Straight forward computations show that this ratio does not depend on   and it is always
equal to  1. Corollary 4.3 then implies that for any given normalized risk aversion   the
dynamics stabilizes with high enough memory span L.
To con rm that these results are applicable also to a stochastic system, we simulate the
model with investment function ˜ f  and a stochastic dividend process. We plot the resulting
dynamics in Fig. 3. The top right panel shows the realization of the exogenous dividend
process. Given this process, simulations are performed for investment strategies with the
same level of the risk aversion   = 2 and two di erent memory spans. The left panels show
the price dynamics (top) and investment shares (bottom). When the memory span is L = 10
(solid line), the steady state is unstable and prices  uctuate. These endogenous  uctuations
are determined by the upper and lower bounds of the investment function and are much
more pronounced than the  uctuations of the exogenous dividend process. When the memory
span is increased to L = 20 (dotted line), the system converges to the stable steady state
equilibrium and observed  uctuations are only due to exogenous noise a ecting the dividend
growth rate.
FIGURE 4 IS ABOUT HERE.
Being particularly interested in assessing the e ect of wealth driven selection, we turn
now to the analysis of a market with many agents. The bottom right panel of Fig. 4 shows
investment functions (5.3) for two di erent values of risk aversion,   and  ′ <  . According
to Proposition 4.3, the survivor should have the highest investment share at the steady state.
Since at y 
  the agent with high risk aversion,  , invests less than the agent with low risk
aversion,  ′, he cannot dominate the market. As a result the steady state A  is unstable.
Whether the less risk averse agent can dominate the market depends on the stability of the
second steady state, A ′, that is on his memory span. If the memory span is high enough, the
steady state A ′ is stable and the less risk averse agent dominates the market.
Fig. 4 shows the market dynamics when one agent has risk aversion   = 2 and memory
L = 20 (which produces a stable dynamics in a single agent case, cf. Fig. 3), and the other
agent has risk aversion  ′ = 1 and memory L′. Simulations for two di erent values of the
memory span L′ are compared. When the memory span of the less risk averse agent is low,
L′ = 20, the steady state A ′ is unstable (see dotted lines). Wealth share of both agents keep
 uctuating between zero and one. However, when the memory of the less risk averse agent
increases to L′ = 30, the new steady state A ′ is stabilized and he ultimately dominates the
market (solid lines). The steady state return now converges, on average, to g + y 
 ′ < g + y 
 .
Interestingly, in our framework low risk aversion leads to market dominance at the cost of
lowering the market return. In fact, the agent with a lower risk aversion dominates the
market, but produces lower equilibrium yield by investing a higher wealth share in the risky
asset. However, as stated in Corollary 4.1, the total wealth return is g, independently from
the survivor investment strategy.
FIGURE 5 IS ABOUT HERE.
22So far we have considered the case of g > rf. What happens when g < rf? We repeat
the simulations we have just performed with an increase of rf such that g < rf. Fig. 5 shows
market dynamics for a single agent with memory span either L = 10 or L = 20. It should
be compared with Fig. 3. Whereas with g > rf the market is stable with long memory and
unstable with high memory, with g < rf the market dynamics stabilizes no matter the value
of L.12 Moreover, the price grows at the constant rate rf (top left panel), no matter the
exogenous  uctuations of the dividend process (top right panel). Since the price grows faster
than the dividend, the dividend yield converges to 0 (bottom right panel). Notice also that at
the steady state the agent is investing a constant fraction of wealth equal to the lower bound
of (5.2), i.e. x  = 0.01 in this case (bottom left panel).
FIGURE 6 IS ABOUT HERE.
Fig. 6 shows the market dynamics when two mean variance optimizers, with di erent values
of risk aversions, are active, and should be compared with Fig. 4. No matter the memory of
the most aggressive agent, the price dynamics stabilizes (top left panel). Prices grow at the
constant rate rf, despite the exogenous  uctuations of the dividend process. Since prices are
growing faster than dividends, the dividend yield converges to 0 (top right panel). At the
steady state both agents survive having positive wealth shares (bottom left panel), and they
both invest x  = 0.01 (bottom right panel).
Summarizing, when g < rf, in accordance with Proposition 4.5, market returns are equal
to the risk free rate, independently from the noise of the dividend process and from the initial
set of investment strategies. As a result, all the investor are gaining the same returns and the
market is not selecting among them.
5.2 The LLS model revisited
The insights developed so far can be used to evaluate various simulations of the LLS model
performed in Levy et al. (1994); Levy and Levy (1996); Levy et al. (2000); Zschischang and
Lux (2001). In fact, as far as the co evolution of prices and wealth, the demand speci cation,
and the dividend process are concerned, the LLS model is built on the same framework as we
consider in this paper.
In the LLS model, at period t investors maximize a power utility function U(Wt+1, ) =
W
1  
t+1 /(1  ) with relative risk aversion   > 0. Furthermore, to forecast the next period total
return zt+1 = kt+1 + yt+1, agents assume that any of the last L returns can occur with equal
probability. Solutions of the maximization of a power utility are not available analytically but
they have been shown to give a wealth independent investment shares. This property holds
for any perceived distribution, g(z), of the next period total return, which is discrete uniform




stands for Expected Power. As this investment function is unavailable in explicit form, the
analysis of the LLS model relies on numeric solutions.
Since our results in Section 4 are valid for any functional form of the investment function,
we are able to give an analytic support to the LLS model. In the example with mean 
variance maximizers, we have seen that the risk aversion determines the capability of agents
12By applying Proposition 4.6 to the investment function f in (5.2), and noticing that, due to the lower
bound, the investment function is always  at at y  = 0, it can be shown that the steady state y  = 0 is stable
for any value of L.
23to invade the market, whereas the memory span in uences the stability of the dynamics. These
properties hold as long as the EIF on the EMC plot shifts upward following a decrease in the





Proposition 5.1. Let fEP
  stand for the partial derivative of the investment function fEP
with respect to the risk aversion coe cient  , and   z for the expected value of the total return.
Then the following result holds:
If   z T 0 , then f
EP T 0 and f
EP
  S 0 .
In our setting, when a positive return is expected, agents with lower risk aversion invest
higher share. Having said this we can use Propositions 4.3 and 4.4 to provide rigorous analytic
support to the simulation results of the LLS model.
In Levy and Levy (1996) the focus is on the role of memory. The authors show that
with a small memory span the log price dynamics is characterized by crashes and booms.
Our analysis shows that this result is due to the presence of an unstable steady state and to
the upper and lower bounds of the investment shares. We also show that this steady state
becomes stable if the memory is high enough. Simulations in Levy and Levy (1996) con rm
this statement; when agents with higher memory are introduced, booms and crashes disappear
and price  uctuations become erratic. But these are the  uctuations which are mainly due to
the exogenous noise of the dividend process, and not to agents’ interactions.
Some other simulations in Levy and Levy (1996) are performed with positive risk free rate
and zero dividend growth rate (i.e. g = 0). These simulations do converge, irrespectively of
the noisy dividend. To understand why and where they converge, recall our analysis for the
case g < rf. We have shown that prices are always growing at the rate rf, no matter the initial
set of investment strategies, and the dividend yield converges to y  = 0. As a result wealth
return is rf for any investment strategy, and no selection on the set of investment strategies
occurs. This is exactly what happens in the simulations.
In Zschischang and Lux (2001) the focus is on the interplay between the length of the
memory span and the risk aversion. Their simulations suggest that the risk aversion is more
important than the memory span in the determination of the dominating agents, providing
that the memory is not too short. The argument has not been put forward in a decisive way
though, as the following quote from Zschischang and Lux (2001) (p. 568, 569) shows:
“Looking more systematically at the interplay of risk aversion and memory span,
it seems to us that the former is the more relevant factor, as with di erent [risk
aversion coe cients] we frequently found a reversal in the dominance pattern:
groups which were fading away before became dominant when we reduced their
degree of risk aversion. [...] It also appears that when adding di erent degrees of
risk aversion, the di erences of time horizons are not decisive any more, provided
the time horizon is not too short.”
Our analytic results make clear how and why this is the case. Agents with low risk aversion
are indeed able to destabilize the market populated by agents with high risk aversion. However,
this “invasion” leads to an ultimate domination only if the invading agents have su ciently
long memory. Otherwise, and this complements the conclusions of Zschischang and Lux (2001)
and related works, agents with di erent risk aversion coe cients will coexist.
24Another new result concerns the case of agents investing a constant fraction of wealth. In
Zschischang and Lux (2001) the authors claim that such agents always dominate the market
and add (p. 571):
“Hence, the survival of such strategies in real life markets remains a puzzle within
the Levy, Levy and Solomon microscopic simulation framework as it does within
the E cient Market Theory.”
Our analysis allows to make this statement more precise. The agents with constant investment
fraction are characterized by the horizontal investment functions, for which Proposition 4.4
guarantees stability, independently of L. If these agents are able to invade the market suc 
cessfully, they will ultimately dominate. However, their market invasion will fail, as soon as
other agents are more aggressive in the steady states created by invaders.
6 Conclusion
In his recent survey, LeBaron (2006) stresses that agent based models do not require analytical
tractability (as opposed to Heterogeneous Agents Models) and, therefore, are more  exible
and realistic for what concerns their assumptions. In this paper we show that  exibility
can be achieved in an analytically tractable heterogeneous agent framework too. In fact, we
have performed an analytic investigation of a stylized model of a  nancial market where an
arbitrary set of investors is trading. Under the assumption that the impact of di erent agents
on the market depends on their wealth shares, we have derived existence and stability results
for a general set of investment functions and an arbitrary number of agents. Due to the
selecting role of wealth dynamics, the steady state equilibrium asset return and agent survival
can be characterized by looking at the intersection of each agent Equilibrium Investment
Function with the so called Equilibrium Market Curve. We have also shown that our analysis
of a deterministic market dynamics is helpful for the understanding of its simulations with a
stochastic dividend process.
Our approach of dealing with general CRRA behavior owes to the work of Anufriev and
Bottazzi (2006). Assuming a more realistic dividend process, namely exogenous growth, we
have reached two research objectives. First, we have been able to investigate which features
of their results are due to their constant dividend yield assumption and which are of a more
general nature. Second, we have provided an analytical support of the LLS simulations, which
would have not be possible within the framework of Anufriev and Bottazzi. As for our  rst
objective, we have shown that the speci cation of the dividend process does play a role in
shaping the price and dividend dynamics. In our framework, the prices grow at a rate that
is derived from the exogenous parameters, while the ecology of trading behaviors can a ect
only the dividend yield. In Anufriev and Bottazzi (2006), on the other hand, the dividend
yield is  xed and the ecology of behaviors a ects the growth rate of prices and, consequently,
dividends. At the same time the common CRRA framework, with a wealth driven selection
and a coupled price wealth dynamics, is responsible for similarities such as the existence of
a low dimensional locus of possible steady states, i.e. Equilibrium Market Curve (though of
di erent shapes).
On the way to our second objective, we have considered an example with mean variance
maximizers characterized by two parameters: degree of risk aversion and memory span used
to estimate future returns. When the growth rate of dividends is bigger than the risk free rate,
the agents with the lowest risk aversion dominate the market, provided that their memory
25spans are big enough. If it is so, the market dynamics converge to the stable steady state
equilibrium, where prices are growing as fast as the dividends and the dividend yield increases
with the risk aversion. In this case price  uctuations are due to the to the exogenous  uctu 
ations of dividends. Otherwise, when the memory is not high enough, agents with di erent
investment strategies coexist and the price  uctuations are endogenously determined. When,
instead, the growth rate of dividends is smaller than the risk free rate, steady state equilibrium
asset returns are equal to risk free returns and the dividend yield converges to zero, no matter
the ecology of agents. As a result wealths returns are equal for all investment functions and
there is no selection. We have also explained that these di erences in the market dynamics
and selecting regime are due to the exogenous in ow of wealth in the economy, both through
dividends and risk less returns. Finally, due to the generality of our approach, we have ex 
tended these results to the simulation study of Levy et al. (1994, 2000), and have resolved a
number of issues concerning the interplay between risk aversion and memory span as reported
in Zschischang and Lux (2001).
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27Appendix
A Dynamical System de ned in Proposition 4.1
After Proposition 4.1 we have shown that the system of equations in (4.2) leads to the well de ned map from
the domain D, speci ed in (4.5), to itself. Here we explicitly provide the evolution operator of the  rst order
dynamical system of 2N + 2L variables. We use the following notation for time t variables
xn,t , ϕn,t ∀n ∈ {1,...,N} and kt,l , yt,l ∀l ∈ {0,...,L   1}, (A.1)
where kt,l and yt,l denote the price return and the dividend yield at time t   l, respectively. We order the
equations in four separated blocks: X, W, K and Y. They de ne, respectively, N investment choices, N wealth
shares, L price returns and L dividend yields. The last two blocks are needed to update the lagged variables.










































































































yt+1,L 1 = yt,L 2 ,
where the following three functions Y , K, and  n have been introduced. The function




gives the dividend yield as a function of past realization of the yield and return, as in the right hand side of












m=1 xm(1   zm)ϕm
(A.4)
gives the price return as a function of the investment choices, wealth shares and the dividend yield as in the






1 + rf + (k + y   rf)xn
1 + rf + (k + y   rf)
 N
m=1 xmϕm
∀n ∈ {1,...,N} (A.5)
28speci es the wealth share of agent n as a function of the investment choices, wealth shares, the dividend yield
and price return13 as in the right hand side of the second equation in (4.2).
B Proof of Proposition 4.2
To solve for the equilibrium of the system (4.2), one can substitute the time variables with equilibrium values




N;k ;y ). The system to be solved is as follows

            




k ,...,k ;y ,...,y  
, ∀n ∈ {1,...,N},
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n = ϕ 
n
(1 + rf) + (k  + y    rf)x 
n
(1 + rf) + (k  + y    rf)
 
x   , ∀n ∈ {1,...,N},




x  (1   x )
  ,
y  = y  1 + g
1 + k  .
(B.1)
Since y  and investment shares are positive, from the third equation k  > rf, while the fourth equation  xes k 
to g. Thus, equilibria exist only when g > rf. In particular, it means that k  +y   rf > 0. The equations for




, which is independent of n. Therefore,
all the survivors invest the same share, x 
 . Plugging this share into the third equation, one gets (4.6).
C Proof of Proposition 4.3
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To derive the stability conditions in di erent equilibria, the Jacobian matrix has to be computed. The Jacobian
depends on the derivatives of the functions Y , K and  n introduced in Appendix A. We compute now the
derivatives of these functions with respect to di erent arguments and perform the straightforward computation






1 + k  , Y k =
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∂k
=  y  1 + g
(1 + k )2 . (C.1)
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(C.2)
13Notice that since the sum of the wealth shares is equal to 1 at any period, one of the equations in the
system (e.g. the last equation of the block W) is redundant and the dynamics can be fully described by
the system of dimension 2N + 2L   1. However, the computations are more symmetric when the relation
ϕN,t = 1  
 N 1
m=1 ϕm,t is not taken into account explicitly.
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(C.3)
where  m
n is the Kronecker’s delta. Using the block structure introduced in Appendix A, the Jacobian can be
written in general form as:
J =
 
   
   
 
   


































   
   
 
   
   
. (C.4)
The block ∂X/∂X is a N   N matrix containing the partial derivatives of the agents’ present investment
choices with respect to the agents’ past investment choices. Since the investment choice of any agent does not






= 0, 1   n,m   N ,
and this block is a zero matrix. The block ∂X/∂W is a N  N matrix containing the partial derivatives of the






= 0, 1   n   N , 1   m   N .
The block ∂X/∂K is a N   L matrix containing the partial derivatives of the agents’ investment choices with
























n   Y k for l = 0 (the  rst column)
fkl
n otherwise.
The block ∂X/∂Y is a N   L matrix containing the partial derivatives of the agents’ investment choices with










n   Y y for l = 0 (the  rst column)
fyl
n otherwise.
The block ∂W/∂X is N  N matrix containing the partial derivatives of the agents’ wealth shares with respect







n +  k
n   Kxm , 1   n,m   N .
The block ∂W/∂W is a N   N matrix containing the partial derivatives of the agents’ wealth shares with







n +  k
n   Kϕm , 1   n,m   N .
30The block ∂W/∂K is a N  L matrix containing the partial derivatives of the agents’ wealth share with respect
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The block ∂W/∂Y is a N  L matrix containing the partial derivatives of the agents’ wealth share with respect
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The block ∂K/∂X is the L N matrix containing the partial derivatives of the lagged returns with respect to









Kxn for l = 0 (the  rst row)
0 otherwise
, 0   l   L   1 , 1   n   N .
The block ∂K/∂W is the L   N matrix containing the partial derivatives of the lagged returns with respect








Kϕn for l = 0 (the  rst row)
0 otherwise
, 0   l   L   1 , 1   n   N .
The block ∂K/∂K is the L L matrix containing the partial derivatives of the lagged returns with respect to
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The block ∂K/∂Y is the L   L matrix containing the partial derivatives of the lagged returns with respect to
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The block ∂Y/∂X is a L N matrix containing the partial derivatives of the lagged dividend yields with respect






= 0, 0   l   L   1, 1   m   N .
The block ∂Y/∂W is a L   N matrix containing the partial derivatives of the lagged dividend yields with






= 0, 0   l   L   1, 1   m   N .
The block ∂Y/∂K is a L L matrix containing the partial derivatives of the lagged dividend yields with respect








Y k for l = j = 0 (the  rst row, the  rst column)
0 otherwise.
31Finally, the block ∂Y/∂Y is a L L matrix containing the partial derivatives of the lagged dividend yields with







   
 
   
   
 
   
Y y 0 ... 0 0
1 0 ... 0 0
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With all these de nitions, one obtains the following statement about the Jacobian in the equilibria of the
system.
Lemma C.1. Let x∗ be an equilibrium of system (4.2) described in Prop. 4.2 and let  rst M agents survive
in this equilibrium. The corresponding Jacobian matrix, J(x∗), has the following structure, where the actual
values of non zero elements, denoted by the symbols ⋆, are varying.
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The solid lines divide the matrix in the same 16 blocks as in (C.4). In addition, the  rst and the second
column blocks as well as the second row block are split into the two parts of sizes M and N  M, corresponding
to the survivors and the non survivors, respectively.
Proof. Let us start with the  rst row block having N rows. The  rst two blocks of columns in this block,
∂X/∂X and ∂X/∂W, are always zero. Two other blocks, ∂X/∂K and ∂X/∂Y, in general contain non zero
elements and simpli ed, because in the equilibrium k  = g and therefore Y y = 1 and Y k =  y /(1 + g).
To simplify the second row block, notice that  k
n =  y
n = 0 in this equilibrium. Indeed, the numerators
of the corresponding general expressions in (C.3) are 0, because all the survivors invest the same share in the





  for all n   M), while for the non survivors ϕ 
n = 0. This immediately implies
that the two last blocks, ∂W/∂K and ∂W/∂Y, contain only zero elements. Furthermore, from the Equilibrium
Market Curve relation (4.6) we get in the equilibrium
1 + rf + (g + y    rf)x 
  = 1 + g . (C.5)
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m)(y  + g   rf)/(1 + g) for n   M (agent n survives)
0 otherwise,
and all the rows corresponding to the non survivors in this block are zero rows. Moreover, all the columns
corresponding to the non survivors contain only zero elements as well, since then  m
n = ϕ 
m = 0. We denote as
 x the remaining (non zero) part of the block ∂W/∂X .












n   ϕ 
n(g   rf)
 
(1 + g) for n,m   M
 ϕ 
nx 
m(y  + g   rf)
 




1 + rf + x 
n(y  + g   rf)
  
(1 + g) for n > M .
(C.6)
The block of the elements from the  rst line of the previous expression is denoted as  
ϕ
S; the block of the
elements of the second line is denoted as  
ϕ
NS; while the block of the elements from the third line (i.e. when
n > M) only the diagonal elements are non zero.
It is obvious that in the next row block with L rows the elements are zero in all the lines but the  rst.
The only exception from this rule are the elements below the main diagonal in the block ∂K/∂K which are all
equal to 1. To compute the elements in the  rst row consider the derivatives of function K derived in (C.2).
For the  rst block, ∂K/∂X, notice that for the non surviving agents Kxm = 0, while for the survivors, i.e. for
m   M
Kxm =  ϕ 
m
1 + rf




Analogously, in the next block, ∂K/∂W, for all the survivors Kϕm = 0, while for all other agents m > M the
elements are given by
Kϕm = x 
m
rf   g + x 
m(y  + g   rf)
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where (C.5) was used to derive the last equality.
The simpli cations in the blocks ∂K/∂K and ∂K/∂Y are minor. Notice from (C.2) that the derivatives
Kzm for all the non survivors are zeros, while for the survivors (m   M) they are given by
Kzm = ϕ 
m
1 + g




Thus, all the sums in the  rst row of this block have to be taken only with respect to the surviving agents.
Finally, in the last row block the simpli cations are straight forward.
The rest of the proof of the Proposition is now clear. Consider the Jacobian matrix derived in Lemma C.1.
The last N   M columns of the left column block contain only zero entries so that the matrix possesses
eigenvalue 0 with (at least) multiplicity N   M. This eigenvalue does not a ect stability. Moreover, these
columns and the corresponding rows can be eliminated from the Jacobian. Analogously, in each of the last
N   M rows in the second row block the only non zero entries belong to the main diagonal. Consequently,
 ϕn
n for n > M are the eigenvalues of the matrix, with multiplicity (at least) one, and the rows (together with
the corresponding columns) can be eliminated from the Jacobian. Using the third line of (C.6) we get the
following N   M eigenvalues
 n =
1 + rf + x 
n(y  + g   rf)
1 + g
=




where the last equality follows from (C.5). Recall that the equilibria we consider, exist only when g > rf.
Then, with a bit of algebra, the stability conditions  1 <  n < 1 can be simpli ed to conditions (4.10).
Finally, notice that the elimination of the rows and columns which we have performed reduce the Jacobian
to the shape which correspond to the Jacobian of the same system in the same equilibrium but without
non surviving agents.
D Proof of Proposition 4.4
Let us proceed with a reduced Jacobian obtained from the matrix in Lemma C.1 after eliminating the rows
and columns corresponding to the survivors. We denote this Jacobian as L, and an identity matrix of the same
dimension (2M + 2L)   (2M + 2L) as I. Then the characteristic polynomial whose roots are the eigenvalues
of L is the determinant det(L    I). First, we analyze it and then we identify new eigenvalues.
33Let us look at the second column block of the size M in this determinant. The only non zero elements
in this block lie in the rows of the second row block, in the part which was called [ 
ϕ
S]. The elements of
this part have been computed in the  rst line in (C.6). Thus, this column block can be represented as     v b+b1 | ... | v b+bk
   , where v = (g  rf)/(1+g) and the following column vectors have been introduced
b =
   
  0 ... 0
 
   ϕ 
1 ...  ϕ 
M
 
  0 0 ... 0
 
  0 0 ... 0
   
 ,
b1 =
   
  0 ... 0
 
  1     ... 0
 
  0 0 ... 0
 
  0 0 ... 0




   
  0 ... 0
 
  0 ... 1    
 
  0 0 ... 0
 
  0 0 ... 0
   
 .
We consider each of the columns in the central block as a sum of two terms and, applying the multilinear
property of the discriminant to the whole matrix L    I, end up with a sum of 2M determinants. Many of
them are zeros, since they contain two or more columns proportional to the same vector b. Actually, there
are only M + 1 non zero elements in the expansion. The simplest has the structure
 
  b1 | ... | bM
 
  in the
second column block. Since the only non zero elements in this block are the terms 1   belonging to the main
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0 . . . 0 0 0 . . .    0 0 . . . 0
0 . . . 0 c1 0 . . . 0 1     0 . . . 0

















































The non zero elements in this matrix have been computed during the proof of Lemma C.1. Namely, the
constant c1 = Y k =  y /(1 + g), the values of Kxm are given in (C.7), c2 = (1 + g)/(x 
 (1   x 
 )) comes
from (C.9), and the derivative Ky = x 
 /(1   x 







l = 1,...,L, as well as
 
fY  
we mean the averages of the corresponding derivatives of the survivors’ investment
functions weighted by their equilibrium wealth shares.
Coming back to the computation of det(L    I), recall that there are other M non zero blocks in the
sum for this determinant. They are obtained when in the second column block all the vectors are bi apart
from the one column v b. But all these determinants can be simpli ed since M  1 of their columns have only
one non zero element 1     on the diagonal, and after eliminating the corresponding columns and rows the
remaining column in the second block will contain the element  v ϕ 
  in the diagonal and zero elements in
other positions. Therefore
det(L  I) = (1  )M detN (1  )M 1 





  detN = (1  )M 1
 
1   




¿From this expression we obtain the eigenvalue equal to 1 of multiplicity M  1. Notice that when M = 1 there
are no such eigenvalues. That is why the system with one survivor is asymptotically stable (of course if all
the roots of polynomial (4.13) are inside the unit circle.) When M > 1 the eigenvalue 1 obviously corresponds
to the movement of the system along the manifold of equilibria. Therefore, it is only the wealth distribution
which is changing in the equilibria but not the other quantities.
Another eigenvalue obtained in the expansion (D.1) is (1 + rf)/(1 + g). It does not a ect the stability,
since rf < g. All the remaining eigenvalues can be obtained from (M +2L) (M +2L) matrix N. We expand
this matrix on the minors of the elements of the  rst row in the last block. Simplifying the resulting minors,
we get
detN = ( 1)Lc1 L 1 detN1(M) + (1    )(  )L 1 detN2(M), (D.2)
34where
N1(M) =
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚











































0 ... 0 1    ... 0 0









0 ... 0 0 0 ... 1   
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚




‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚











































0 ... 0 1    ... 0 0









0 ... 0 0 0 ... 1   
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚
,
The determinants of these two matrices of similar structure are computed in a recursive way. The following
lemma is used.
Lemma D.1.
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
x1 x2 x3 ... xn 1 xn
1    0 ... 0 0
0 1    ... 0 0







0 0 0 ...    0
0 0 0 ... 1   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 




xk  n k , (D.3)
Proof. Consider this determinant as a sum of elements from the  rst row multiplied on the corresponding
minor. The minor of element xk, whose corresponding sign is ( 1)k+1, is a block diagonal matrix consisting of
two blocks. The upper left block is an upper diagonal matrix with 1’s on the diagonal. The lower right block
is a lower diagonal matrix with   ’s on the diagonal. The determinant of this minor is equal to (  )n k and
the relation to be proved immediately follows.
Consider now the expansion of the matrix N1(M) by the minors of the elements from the  rst column. The
minor of the  rst element    is a matrix with a structure similar to N1(M), which we denote as N1(M  1).
The minor associated with Kx1 has a left upper block with M  1 entries equal to    below the main diagonal.
This block generates a contribution  M 1 to the determinant and once its columns and rows are eliminated,
one remains with a matrix of the type (D.3). Applying Lemma D.1 one then has
detN1(M) = (  ) detN1(M   1) + ( 1)MKx1 M 1( 1)L+1
 
fY
1  L 1 +




1  L 1 l
 
.
Applying recursively the relation above, the dimension of the determinant is progressively reduced. At the
end the lower right block of the original matrix remains, which is again a matrix similar to (D.3). Applying
once more Lemma D.1 one has for N1(M) the following






m L 1 +
L 1  
l=0
fyl
m L 1 l
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 L 1 + c2




 L 1 l
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35The determinant of matrix N2(M) can be computed analogously and we obtain






m L 1 +
L 1  
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fkl
m L 1 l
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+ ( 1)M+L+1  M
 




fY   
 L 1 + c2




 L 1 l
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= ( 1)M+L+1  M 1
 





 L 1 +
















Plugging the two last expressions in (D.2) we  nally obtain





 L 1 +
















+ (1    )( 1)M M+L 2
 





 L 1 +
















= ( 1)M+1 M+L 2
 
(1    ) L+1 + c1 LKY  















 L 1 
1   (1    )
 
+ c1




 L 1 l   (1    )




 L 1 l
  
=
= ( 1)M+1 M+L 2
 










 L + c1




 L 1 l   (1    )




 L 1 l
  
where in the last equality we used the relation  c2(1 + c1Ky) =  (1 + rf)/(x 
 (1   x 
 )), which can be easily
checked using the de nitions of the constants c2, c1 and Ky.
Thus, we have found another zero eigenvalue of multiplicity M+L 2 and yet another eigenvalue 1+c1Ky =
(1+rf)/(1+g) which lies inside the unit circle since rf < g. The stability will depend only on the roots of the
polynomial in the squared brackets. After some simpli cations and using the relation x 
 (1 x 
 ) =  y l′(y ),
which can be directly checked from the de nition of the Equilibrium Market Curve, we get the polynomial
(4.13).
E Proof of Corollaries 4.2 and 4.3
When L = 1 the polynomial ˜ Q( ) in (4.13) can be simpli ed and it is given by
 2 +  C
1 + g










m(y  + g)ϕ 
m
 
l′(y ). Let us introduce two quantities, trace and determinant, as follows
Tr =  C(1 + g)/y  and Det =  C(1 + (1 + g)/y ). According to standard results for the second degree
polynomial (see e.g. Medio and Lines (2001)), we get the following conditions for stability, whose equality
correspond to the bifurcation loci of fold,  ip and Neimark Sacker bifurcation respectively,
1   Tr+Det > 0, 1 + Tr+Det > 0, and Det < 1.
Using our de nitions of Tr and Det we get the conditions C < 1, C < y /(y +2(1+g)) and C >  y /(1+g+y )
respectively. The  rst condition is redundant, while the last two give (4.14).
For larger L the results on stability are limited. First, we can derive the loci of fold and  ip bifurcations
substituting, respectively,   = 1 and   =  1 into polynomial ˜ Q( ) in (4.13). Straight forward computations
show that the line C = 1 is a locus of fold bifurcation for any L, while the curve C = y /(y  + 2(1 + g)) is a
locus of  ip bifurcation for any odd L (and there is no  ip bifurcation, when L is even).
36Second, plugging   = ei , where   is arbitrary angle and i is the imaginary unit, into equation ˜ Q( ) = 0
we can derive the locus of Neimark Sacker bifurcation. In case of L = 2 the equation can be solved and, after
tedious computations, one get the condition
C2  
y 2 + 3(1 + g)y  + 2(1 + g)2 
+ 2C y 2   4y 2 = 0.
This second order curve is depicted in the right panel of Fig. 2 in coordinates (y ,C).
Finally, we analyze the case L → ∞. Rewrite polynomial (4.13) as follows
˜ Q( ) =  L 1
 
 2  
1
L
1   (1/ )
L
1   1/ 
 







We want to proof that all the roots of this polynomial lie inside the unit circle of the complex plane for L high
enough. Consider the region outside the unit circle (including the circle itself),  x   =  0 and let L → ∞.
Since | 0|   1, the  rst term in (E.1) cannot be equal to zero. Therefore,  0 can be a root of the characteristic
polynomial only if the expression in the parenthesis cancels out. First, assume that | 0| > 1. Then when
L → ∞ the expression in the parenthesis leads to  0 = 0 which contradicts our choice of  0. Second, let
| 0| = 1 but  0  = 1. In this case the expression |1   (1/ )
L | is bounded (uniformly with L), and so, again
taking the limit L → ∞ we obtain  0 = 0. Thus, the only remaining possibility is  0 = 1, which wul imply
C = 1, that is to the locus of fold bifurcation. Since we know that when the relative slope is C = 0, the
steady state is stable by continuity it follows that whenever C < 1 the steady state is stable too. This implies
(4.15), and proofs Corollary 4.3.
F Proof of Proposition 4.5
In Proposition 4.1 we have proved that the system is well de ned on D given in (4.5). Along the same lines
it is straightforward to show that T is also well de ned on D′. In particular, an extension for zero dividend
yield does not create any problem. Since D   D′, the  xed points de ned in Proposition 4.2 are also the  xed
points in D′. In those points, of course, y   = 0.
In all other  xed points y  = 0, while other quantities are obtained again from (B.1). From the third
equation it immediately follows that k  = rf. Thus, the investment in the risky and the riskless asset yields
the same return. Therefore, the wealths of all the agents increase with the same rate, the second equations
(B.1) are always satis ed, and no other restrictions on the agents’ wealth shares are required.
G Proof of Proposition 4.6
The procedure in this proof is analogous to the one we use for proving Propositions 4.3 and 4.4. In particular
we use the derivatives and the general Jacobian structure which has been derived in Appendix C. The next
Lemma, which is analogous to Lemma C.1 describes the Jacobian matrix for the steady states with zero yield.
Lemma G.1. Let x∗ be a steady state of dynamics (4.2) described in Proposition 4.5 and let the  rst M
agents survive in this equilibrium. The corresponding Jacobian matrix, J(x∗), has the following structure,
37where the actual values of non zero elements, denoted by the symbols ⋆, are varying.
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   












. . . [ ∂X
∂K ] [ ∂X
∂Y ]
0 ... 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 0 ⋆ ... ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ... ⋆ ⋆
⋆ ... ⋆ 0 ... 0 1 ... 0 0 ... 0 ⋆ ... ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ... ⋆ ⋆









. . . [  k ] [  y ]
⋆ ... ⋆ 0 ... 0 0 ... 1 0 ... 0 ⋆ ... ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ... ⋆ ⋆




















0 ... 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 1 0 ... 0 0 0 0 ... 0 0
⋆ ... ⋆ 0 ... 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 0 ⋆ ... ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ... ⋆ ⋆




















0 ... 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 1 0 0 0 ... 0 0
0 ... 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 0 0
1+g
1+rf 0 ... 0 0





















0 ... 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 0 0 0 0 ... 1 0
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
The solid lines divide the matrix in the same 16 blocks as in (C.4). In addition, the  rst and second column 
blocks and second row block are split into the two parts of sizes M and N  M, corresponding to the survivors
and the non survivors, respectively.
Proof. Let us start with the  rst row block having N rows. The  rst two blocks of columns in this block,
∂X/∂X and ∂X/∂W, are always zero. Two other blocks, ∂X/∂K and ∂X/∂Y, in general contain non zero
elements and simpli ed, because in the equilibrium k  = rf and y  = 0, and therefore Y y = (1 + g)/(1 + rf)
and Y k = 0.
To simplify the remaining row blocks, notice from (C.3) that  xm
n = 0 and  ϕm
n =  m
n , while  k








)/(1+rf) in this equilibrium. This follows immediately from the relation k  +y   rf = 0. At the





x (1 x )
 







Thus, in the  rst block of the second row block, ∂W/∂X, the elements are equal to  k
n  Kxm and they are
zeros as soon as either n or m is larger than M. In the next block, ∂W/∂W, all the elements are zeros, apart
from the main diagonal elements. All the elements of the next block, ∂W/∂K, contain the multiplying term
 k
n, so that they are non zeros only for the surviving agents. We denote the corresponding part of the block as
[ k]. Similarly, in the block ∂W/∂Y all the elements are the sums containing either the term  k
n or the term
 y
n, so that they are non zeros only for the surviving agents. We denote the corresponding part of the block
as [ y].
In the next row block, with L rows, the elements are zeros in all the lines but the  rst. The only exception
from thisrule are the elements below the main diagonal in the block ∂K/∂K which are all equal to 1. For
the elements in the  rst row we use the derivatives of function K derived above. Consequently, in the  rst
block, ∂K/∂X, for the non surviving agents we have Kxm = 0. Analogously, in the next block, ∂K/∂W, all
the elements are zeros. The simpli cations in the blocks ∂K/∂K and ∂K/∂Y are minor. Notice from (C.2)
that the derivatives Kzm for all the non survivors are zeros, therefore all the sums in the  rst row of this block
have to be taken only with respect to the surviving agents.
Finally, in the last row block the simpli cations are straight forward.
In the remaining part of this proof we identify di erent multipliers of the matrix derived in the previous
Lemma. From the  rst line in the fourth row block we immediately obtain the eigenvalue (1 + g)/(1 + rf)
and condition g < rf for stability. Elimination of this line together with the corresponding column creates a
zero line in the same block. Proceeding recursively, we obtain the eigenvalue 0 with multiplicity L   1 and
eliminate the fourth line  and column block entirely.
From the second column block we get the eigenvalue 1 with multiplicity N. These eigenvalues correspond
to the directions of change in the wealth distribution between di erent agents. (Recall from Proposition 4.5
38that the wealth shares are free of choice.) Consequently, there are no asymptotically stable equilibria. At
the same time, it is clear that these eigenvalues, lying on the border of the unit circle, do not prevent the
steady state from stability.
From the last N M columns of the  rst column block we obtain the eigenvalue 0 with multiplicity N M.
Eliminating corresponding columns and rows we get the following matrix
N3(M) =
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚
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0 ... 0 0 0 ... 1   
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚
‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚ ‚
,
where, as we found in Lemma G.1, the derivatives are Kzm =  Kxm = ϕ 
m(1+rf)/
 
x (1 x )
 
. This matrix
has the same functional form as matrices N1(M) and N2(M) whose discriminant we computed in Appendix D.
Proceeding in analogous way, we get
detN3(M) = ( 1)M+L+1  M 1  M
m=1
Kxm
  L 1
l=0
fkl
m L 1 l
 
+
+ ( 1)M+L+1  M
 






m L 1 l
 
=
=  ( 1)M+L+1  M 1 1 + rf  






 L 1 l+
+ ( 1)M+L+1  M
 
   L +
1 + rf  






 L 1 l
 
=
= ( 1)M+L  M 1
 
 L+1 +
1 + rf  
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Figure 1: Location of equilibria for g > rf. Left panel: The Equilibrium Market Curve is shown
together with one Equilibrium Investment Function, curve I. In total there are two intersections
with the EMC, corresponding to two di erent steady states, A and B. Right panel: When the
investment function II is added one more steady state is possible, point C. In points A and B agent
I survives with ϕI = 1. In point C agent II survives with ϕII = 1. The abscissa of a point gives the
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Figure 2: Stability conditions. Left panel: According to (4.10), the steady state is stable (against
the invasion by the non survivors) if the non survivors are less aggressive, i.e. their investment shares
lie below the investment share of the survivors (gray area). Right panel: Stability of a steady state









belongs to the dark grey area. When L = 2 the stability region
expands and consists of the union of the dark grey and light grey areas. When L → ∞ the stability
region occupies all the space below “fold” line
 
f′(y  + g)
 
/l′(y ) = 1. Crossing the border of the

























































































Figure 3: Dynamics with a single mean variance maximizer in a market with rf = 0.01 and
stochastic dividend with average growth rate g = 0.04 and variance  2
g = 0.1. Two levels of
memory span are compared. Top left panel: log price. Bottom left panel: investment
























































































Figure 4: Dynamics with two mean variance maximizers in a market with rf = 0.01 and
stochastic dividend with average growth rate g = 0.04 and variance  2
g = 0.1. Two levels of
memory span of the agent with lower risk aversion are compared. Top left panel: log price.
Bottom left panel: wealth share of the agent with lower risk aversion. Top right panel:
dividend yield. Bottom right panel: EMC and two investment functions. The agent with



















































































Figure 5: Dynamics with a single mean variance maximizer in a market with rf = 0.05 and
stochastic dividend with average growth rate g = 0.04 and variance  2
g = 0.1. Two levels of
memory span are compared. Top left panel: log price. Bottom left panel: investment




























































































Figure 6: Dynamics with two mean variance maximizers in a market with rf = 0.05 and
stochastic dividend with average growth rate g = 0.04 and variance  2
g = 0.1. Two levels
of memory span of the agent with lower risk aversion are compared. Top left panel: log 
price dynamics. Bottom left panel: wealth share of the agent with lower risk aversion  ′.
Top right panel: dividend yield. Bottom right panel: weighted average of the agents’
investment shares.
44